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I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Appealable Summary Judgment Motions
Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment is not appealable unless the district court certifies the
question presented as important and doubtful.' An exception
to this rule exists where the motion denied is based on govern-
mental immunity from suit or lack of personal jurisdiction.2
In McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church,' the Minnesota
Supreme Court formulated as another exception to this general
rule, motions based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4
Specifically, the court held that an order denying an employer's
motion for summary judgment in an employee's action for
negligence against the employer was immediately appealable,
where the dismissal of the action was based on the district
court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the exclusivity
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.'
In this case, Diane McGowan commenced a negligence
action against her employer, Our Savior's Lutheran Church.'
McGowan was working as director of the homeless shelter at the
church when she was attacked and raped by a shelter client.7
McGowan sought damages for the injuries she sustained as a
result of being raped while at work.8
On the district court level, the church argued that the
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act barred McGowan's
1. MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(h).
2. See Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1986) (holding
that an order is appealable if the motion for summaryjudgment is based on a claim of
governmental immunity from suit); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 88-89,
172 N.W.2d 292, 300 (1969) (holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is appealable as of right), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
3. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1995). In
McGowan, the court also decided a substantive workers' compensation issue. For a
summary of the substantive issue, see the workers' compensation section of this
summary. See infra part XIA.1.
4. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 833.
5. Id.
6. Id, at 831.
7. Id. at 832.
8. Id. at 831.
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lawsuit.9 The church sought to have the suit dismissed based on
the district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 10 Mc-
Gowan argued that her injuries were excluded by the Minnesota
Workers' Compensation Act under Minnesota Statutes section
176.011, otherwise known as the "assault exception."" Mc-
Gowan argued that her injuries fall under this exception, as they
are the product of an intentional assault that was personal to her
and unrelated to her employment at the church.1
2
The district court denied the church's motion."3 The court
found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the
assailant's motive for the attack and that a question as to whether
the "assault exception" applied in this case remained. 4 Upon
this finding, the church filed a direct appeal and a petition for
discretionary review in the Minnesota Court of Appeals." The
court of appeals held that this was an appeal from a nonappeal-
able order and denied the petition for review. 6 The Minnesota
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether an order
denying an employer's motion for summary judgment in an
employee's negligence action is immediately appealable when
dismissal of the action is sought based on the district court's lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
17
Rule 103.03(h) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure states that an order denying a motion for summary
judgment is not appealable unless the district court certifies the
question presented as important and doubtful.1" Exceptions to
9. Id. Prior to this suit, McGowan received workers' compensation benefits for
the injuries resulting from the rape. Id.
10. Id.
11. Minnesota Statutes § 176.011, subdivision 16 (1994) reads in relevant part:
"Personal injury" means injury arising out of and in the course of
employment .... But shall not include an injury caused by the act
of a third person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee
because of personal reasons, and not directed against the employee
as an employee, or because of the employment.
MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd. 16 (1994).





17. Id. at 832. The court also considered the substantive issue of whether
McGowan's claim falls within the 'assault exception' of the Minnesota Workers'
Compensation Act. Id. at 833.
18. MINN. R. CIv. APp. P. 103.03(h).
[Vol. 22
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this rule exists where the motion denied is based on governmen-
tal immunity from suit or lack of personal jurisdiction.
19
The rationale behind the government immunity exception
is that government officials with immunity should not be "forced
to endure the expense and delay of proceeding to trial."20 This
same rationale applies to the personal jurisdiction exception.21
In Hunt v. Nevada State Bank,2 the court reasoned that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is appealable as "it is more realistic
to view such an order not merely as a retention of an action for
trial, but as a determination of right, for a defendant is com-
pelled thereby to take up the burden of litigation in this state
that might otherwise be avoided."2"
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that to be
consistent with this rationale, the denial of a motion based on
subject matter jurisdiction should not be treated differently.24
The issue raised by the church's motion falls into 'that small
class which finally determines claims of right, separable from,
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important
to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself
to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated.'25
The court reasoned that if the district court is without
subject matter jurisdiction it is senseless to have the parties go
through a trial.26 Therefore, the order denying the church's
motion is immediately appealable because if McGowan's claim
falls under the scope of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation
Act the district court is without jurisdiction to proceed fur-
therY
19. See supra note 2.
20. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 832 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985)).
21. Id. at 833.
22. 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969).
23. Id. at 88-89, 172 N.W.2d at 300.
24. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 833.
25. Id. (citing Mitche/ 472 U.S. at 524-25 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
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B. PersonalJurisdiction
In Domtar v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co.,2  the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that a Minnesota court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over a Canadian insurance company. 9
Domtar, a Canadian corporation, owned a portion of the St.
Louis River/Interlake/Duluth Tar Site (site) located in Duluth,
Minnesota.3" On the site, Domtar operated a tar processing
plant until 1955, when Domtar sold its interest.
31
In 1987 the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA),
following an investigation, determined that hazardous substances
had been released at the site, thereby contaminating the
groundwater.32 In response to this discovery, the MPCA issued
to Domtar a Request For Response Action (RFRA) . Domtar,
alleging that Canadian General issued to Domtar general liability
policies that would cover the time Domtar owned part of the
site, sought a judgment in Minnesota court declaring that
Canadian General Insurance Company is obliged to defend
Domtar against the MPCA.34 Domtar also requested that
Canadian General Insurance Company reimburse Domtar for
investigation costs.
35
Canadian General moved to dismiss Domtar's claims based
on lack of personal jurisdiction.3 6 The district court denied this
motion, concluding that Canadian General was subject to
personal jurisdiction in Minnesota:3 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court.' In its
appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Canadian General
contended that its contacts in Minnesota are constitutionally
insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota. 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court in its opinion stated that to
28. 533 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1995).
29. Id. at 34.
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sustain personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation the court
must find the following: (1) that personal jurisdiction is autho-
rized by the Minnesota long-arm statute; and (2) that the
exercise of such jurisdiction does not violate the due process
requirement that the nonresident defendant have certain
"minimum contacts" with the forum state.' The Minnesota
long-arm statute "permits courts to assert jurisdiction over
defendants to the extent that federal constitutional requirements
of due process will allow."41 Thus, the court concluded that it
only needed to consider whether it is consistent with federal
constitutional requirements of due process for a Minnesota court
to assert jurisdiction over Canadian General.42
To satisfy federal due process, it must be established that
Canadian General has had minimum contacts in Minnesota. The
minimum contacts requirement may be satisfied in two different
contexts: general personal jurisdiction and specific personal
jurisdiction.4' General jurisdiction requires the defendant to
have "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum
state." The court quickly concluded that Canadian General's
activities within Minnesota were insufficient to constitute
'continuous and systematic' contacts, thus Minnesota does not
have general personal jurisdiction over Canadian General.'
The court then examined Canadian General's contacts in
Minnesota to see if they were sufficient to impose specific
personal jurisdiction.' Specific personal jurisdiction exists
when "the defendant's contacts with the forum state are limited,
40. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1994)); see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945). The contacts must "comport with 'traditional notions ... of fair play and
substantial justice.'" Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 29 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
41. Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 29 (Minn. 1995) (citing Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color
Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1992)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 30; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984).
44. Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 30 (citing Helicpteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 415-16; Real
Properties, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 427 N.W.2d 665, 669 (Minn. 1988)). "General
personal jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum
state are so substantial and are of such a nature that the state may assert jurisdiction
over the defendant even for causes of action unrelated to the defendant's contacts with
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yet connected with the plaintiff's claim such that the claim arises
out of or relates to the defendant's contact with the forum."4 7
A single contact with the forum can be sufficient to constitute
specific personal jurisdiction if the cause of action arises out of
that contact.48
Domtar argued to the court that Minnesota may assert
specific jurisdiction over Canadian General based on its agree-
ment to insure Domtar's Minnesota tar manufacturing opera-
tions.49 Courts have been known to impose specific personal
jurisdiction on out-of-state insurers. Several courts have conclud-
ed "that a court may assert specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident insurer when (1) the insurer knows of its insured's
contact with the forum; (2) the risk insured against transpires in
the forum state; and (3) the forum state is not excluded from
the geographic coverage of the insurance policy."5"
The court focused on the decision in Farmers Insurance
Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Co.,5 where the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Montana court had
specific personal jurisdiction over a Canadian insurer whose
insured was involved in a Montana car accident.52 The dispute
in Farmers Insurance arose from a single car accident in Mon-
tana.53 The owner of the car and his wife resided in Canada at
the time of the accident and were insured by Portage La Prairie
Mutual Insurance Company, a Canadian insurer.54
At the time of the accident Lisa Lorango was driving the
vehicle.55 Lorango was insured by Farmers Insurance, a Califor-
nia insurance company.56 Although both insurance companies,
47. Id.; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414.
48. Domtar, 533 N.W.2d at 31 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957)).
49. Id.
50. Id. "The 'territory-of-coverage rule' generally provides that, in exercising
specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident insurance companies, courts infer the
necessary contact from policy language defining the territory of coverage." Id. (citing
William C. Hoffman, PersonalJurisdiction Over Alien Insurance Companies: The Territory-of-
Coverage Rue, 26 ToRT & INS. L.J. 703 (1991)).
51. 907 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 913.
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Portage and Farmers, were obligated to provide liability, only
Farmers provided coverage." Thus, Farmers brought an action
in Montana federal district court against Portage seeking
declaratory relief and damages for Portage's refusal to reimburse
Farmers. 8
The court concluded that because Portage's insurance policy
coverage extended into Montana, and because an insured event
resulted in litigation, Portage had purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state.59 The
court reasoned that personal jurisdiction over Portage derived
from its contractual obligation to indemnify and defend its
insured, a duty that foreseeably required litigation in any forum
where the insured risk traveled.'
The court also distinguished this situation from the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,6" where the court did not find the existence of specific
personal jurisdiction over an insurer whose only contact with the
forum state is the issuance of an insurance policy covering an
accident that occurred in the forum state.62 In World Wide
Volkswagen, the plaintiffs who had purchased an automobile from
a New York dealer and distributor, sued the dealer and distribu-
tor in Oklahoma, after being involved in a collision in Oklaho-
ma.6" The Supreme Court held that the mobility of the auto-
mobile and the defendant's ability to foresee its movement to
other states were not enough to satisfy the requirements of due
process.' Thus, the Oklahoma court could not constitutionally
assert jurisdiction over the defendants.'
The court in Farmer's Insurance reasoned that unlike the
sellers in World Wide, the liability insurers contracted to defend
and indemnify the insured for claims that will foreseeably result
in the litigation of foreign states.6 If Portage wished to avoid
suit in Montana it could have excluded that state from the policy
57. Id.
58. Id. at 32.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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territory.
67
The approach of asserting personal jurisdiction over insur-
ance companies exemplified by Farmers Insurance Exchange
faithfully observes the Supreme Court's emphasis in contract
cases on the future consequences contemplated by the parties
when executing the contract. In the general liability insur-
ance context, the parties contemplate that the insurer will
defend and indemnify the insured. Further, the defense is
presumably contemplated to occur where the insured is
sued.68
In Domtar, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in determining if
specific personal jurisdiction exists, first analyzed whether the
insured knew of the insured's contacts with the forum state.69
In evaluating whether Canadian General knew of Domtar's
operations in Minnesota, the court noted that the insurer has a
commercial interest in knowing about the insured's contacts with
the forum state to fix premiums. 70 The court then examined
Canadian General's underwriting practice and its approach to
insuring United States risks, while also reviewing the operations
of Domtar and the possibility that Domtar could be liable for
groundwater contamination in Minnesota.71 The court con-
cluded that Canadian General constructively knew that Domtar
operated a plant in Minnesota, and by deciding to issue a
general insurance policy to Domtar, Canadian General purpose-
fully established the required minimum contacts with Minneso-
ta.
72
Based on the above conclusions, the court held that
Domtar's coverage claim against Canadian General arises out of
Canadian General's minimum contacts with Minnesota, thereby
supporting a Minnesota court's assertion of specific personal
jurisdiction.7m
The court then examined whether a Minnesota court's
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 33; see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (stating that insurers have a commercial interest in knowing where an insured
risk is located in order to accurately estimate the liability risks and appropriately adjust
the policy premium) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987).
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assertion of specificjurisdiction over Canadian General would be
in sync with "traditional notions of fair play and justice."74 In
deciding this question, courts consider various factors including
the burden on the defendant to litigate in the forum state, the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the inter-
state judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution, and the shared interest of the states in furthering
social policy.7" Because Canadian General is familiar with the
judicial system in the United States, this familiarity supports the
reasonableness of retaining jurisdiction in Minnesota. Thus,
Canadian General was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in
Minnesota.
7
C. Submission ofJurisdiction; Vacation of Void Judgments
Generally, a valid judgment cannot be rendered against a
party without due service of process.78 However, in Peterson v.
Eishen,9 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld an exception to
this rule, holding that where a defendant takes some affirmative
step to invoke the power of the court or to implicitly recognize
its jurisdiction, that defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, although improperly served.8'
In 1982 Larry Eishen was declared the father of Mary
81Peterson's child in a default paternity adjudication. In a
subsequent hearing, orders for child support were entered
against Eishen despite his failure to appear, and the county
began to collect these payments by intercepting Eishen's tax
returns. 82 In 1986 Eishen voluntarily submitted a blood test to
74. Id. at 34 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320
(1945)). "The concept of 'fair play and substantial justice' can defeat the reasonable-
ness ofjurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities."
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116; Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985). The defendant bears the burden of presenting
"a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render
jurisdiction unreasonable." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
75. Donuar, 533 N.W.2d at 34.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Lange v. Johnson, 295 Minn. 320, 204 N.W.2d 205 (1973).
79. 512 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1994).
80. Id. at 340.
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the county attorney's office, who filed the results with the district
court.8 3 In 1991 Eishen moved the district court to vacate the
judgment of paternity and child support orders for want of
adequate service of process.84
Eishen's motion was denied by a family court referee. 5
The referee found that the service of process in 1982 was
adequate and Eishen knew of the appellant's claims, yet did not
seek relief of judgment within a reasonable time.86 However,
the district court reversed this finding, concluding service was
inadequate.8 7 The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed with the
district court.88
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that although a
valid judgment cannot be rendered against a party without due
service of process,89 a party who takes or consents to any step
in a proceeding that assumes jurisdiction exists has made a
general appearance that subjects him to the jurisdiction of the
court.9" The issue in front of the court was then whether Eishen
took any step that would bring him under the jurisdiction of the
court.9" Concluding that the blood test was not a contact with
the court, the court determined that Eishen did not submit to
the jurisdiction of the court.
92
The court in this case also addressed the question of
whether Eishen's motion to vacate thejudgment of paternity and
child support orders was timely.9" The court examined Rule
60.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure94 and chapter
83. Id.





89. Id. (citing Lange v. Johnson, 295 Minn. 320, 204 N.W.2d 205 (1973)).




93. Id. at 341.
94. Rule 60.02 provides the following-
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment (other
than a divorce decree), order or proceeding and may order a new
trial or grant such other relief as may be just for the following
reasons: (a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b)
Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial pursuant to Rule
[Vol. 22
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518 of the Minnesota Statutes which discuss the reopening of a
void judgment. The court stated as follows:
although the language of the rule and the statute indicate
that the motions to vacate void judgments must be made
within a reasonable time ... there is no time limit for
commencing proceedings to set aside a judgment void for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties.9 5
Thus, Eishen's motion was found to be timely.9"
D. Trial Court's Discretion In Scheduling Matters
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated in the order of Rice
Park Properties v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Cires P 7 that the district
court "has considerable discretion in scheduling matters and in
furthering what it has identified as the interests of judicial
administration and economy.""8 In this order, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the writ of mandamus sought by the
plaintiff, Rice Park properties. 99  The writ compelled the
Ramsey County District Court to vacate its stay of unlawful
detainer proceedings pending the final disposition in a related
and earlier filed declaratoryjudgment action commenced by the
defendant, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi. 1°  The Court
reasoned that although Minnesota Statutes section 566.08
envisions prompt dispositions of these summary proceedings, the
orders of the district court will be honored, as long as the court
does not abuse its discretion.
10 1
Mary Ritter Kuehl
59.03; (c) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (d) The judgment is void .... The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a), (b), and (c) not more
than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered
or taken.
MINN. R. Cv. P. 60.02.
95. Peterson, 512 N.W.2d at 341; see Lange v. Johnson, 295 Minn. 320, 204 N.W.2d
205 (1973); Beede v. Nides Fin. Corp., 209 Minn. 354, 296 N.W. 413 (1941).
96. Peterson, 512 N.W,2d at 341.
97. 532 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. 1995).
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